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ABSTRACT
In 2011, the Leahy–Smith America Invents Act (AIA)
was signed into law, bringing significant changes to the
Patent Act of 1952. Arguably, the most substantial change
was the demise of the “American approach” to patent law:
the “first-to-invent” patent filing system. Congress, by
enacting the AIA, changed America's patent system from
“first-to-invent” to “first-inventor-to-file,” sparking
controversy among patent scholars and practitioners, with
some individuals arguing that this change was
unconstitutional. Recently, the Federal Circuit faced an
issue of first impression when an inventor challenged the
constitutionality of the first-inventor-to-file provisions of
the AIA, and by extension the AIA as a whole, under Article
I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution in
the case of MadStad Engineering, Inc. v. USPTO. While
ruling against MadStad based on standing, and not on the
constitutionality issue, the court gave some insight for a
challenger to establish standing by showing a substantial
risk of injury actually arising from the first-inventor-to-file
*
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provision of the AIA. From the MadStad ruling, it is clear
that the arguments of the constitutionality of the AIA’s firstinventor-to-file provisions are far from settled.
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INTRODUCTION
Practitioners and academics alike have debated the
constitutionality of the American Invents Act (“AIA”) since before
it was signed into law on September 16, 2011.1 Notably, some
1

See, e.g., Jonathan S. Massey, Why First To File Is Unconstitutional, in
WHY H.R. 1249 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 1, 1 (2011), docs.piausa.org/112thCongress%20(2011-2012)/Why%20H.R.%201249%20is%20Unconstitutional
.pdf; Andrew L. Sharp, Misguided Patent Reform: The Questionable
Constitutionality of First-to-File, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 1227, 1253 (2013); John
Burke, Examining the Constitutionality of the Shift to "First Inventor to File" in
the Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, 39 J. LEGIS. 69, 87 (2013); Edward C.
Walterscheid, Priority of Invention: How the United States Came to Have a
“First-to-Invent” Patent System, 23 AIPLA Q.J. 263, 286 (1995); Eric P.
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academics question the constitutionality of changing America’s
first-to-invent patent system to a first-inventor-to-file patent
system, bringing the United States in line with the rest of the
world’s patent regimes.2 They argue that the implementation
provisions of the AIA do not comport with the original intent
behind Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States
Constitution (the “IP Clause”) and the legislative history and intent
behind patent law in America.3 A recent ruling by the Federal
Circuit, Madstad Engineering, Inc. v. U.S. Patent & Trademark
Office, enlightens the procedural context of the continuing debate
as to whether certain provisions of the AIA are constitutional.4
Although the Court ruled that MadStad lacked federal standing, a
constitutional challenge to the AIA could be brought if one were to
follow the Federal Circuit’s murky path, achieve standing, and
maintain a cognizable argument for unconstitutionality.
In Part I, this Article sets out a brief historical backdrop of the
Constitution’s IP Clause, explains how America came to have a
first-to-invent patent system, and discusses who qualifies as a true
“Inventor” under prior patent laws. Following the history of the IP
Clause, Part II of this Article describes questions regarding the
constitutionality of the AIA and arguments that the first-inventorto-file provisions of the AIA are unconstitutional. In Part III, this
Article explores the MadStad case, its facts, procedure, and
eventual majority opinion. Ruling against MadStad on the standing
issue, the Federal Circuit avoided the constitutional issues
MadStad raised in its initial complaint. The Federal Circuit’s
opinion invites discussion of how one can establish standing to
challenge the AIA. Finally, Part IV of this Article discusses the
ramifications of the MadStad ruling; the constitutionality of the
first-inventor-to-file patent system; and practice pointers on how
standing can be achieved and what, if any, constitutional
Vandenburg, America Invents Act: How It Affects Small Businesses, 50 IDAHO
L. REV. 201, 205 (2013); see also Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
2
Dennis Crouch, First-to-File versus First-Inventor-to-File, PATENTLY-O
(Dec. 11, 2009), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2009/12/first-to-file-versus-firstinventor-to-file.html.
3
Burke, supra note 1, at 87.
4
Madstad Eng'g, Inc. v. USPTO, 756 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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challenges can be sustained.
I. BRIEF HISTORICAL BACKDROP: THE “IP CLAUSE” AND WHO
QUALIFIES AS AN INVENTOR
Prior to the changes made by the AIA, the United States
granted patent rights based on a first-to-invent system, whereby the
first individual to conceive of a new invention and reduce it to
practice received the patent.5 In order to understand the new firstinventor-to-file system and its origins, it is helpful to briefly
consider Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States
Constitution and the historical definition of “Inventor.”
A. Development of the IP Clause: Who is an “Inventor?”
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 (the “IP Clause”) of the
Constitution states: “To promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.”6 Some scholars have argued that the IP Clause is the
only clause granting power to Congress that specifically provides
the authorized means to accomplish the clause’s stated purpose.7
Some scholars argue that, because common usage and Supreme
Court precedent indicate that the term “Inventor” actually means
the “first inventor,” Congress is only authorized to endow first
inventors with patent rights.8 Other scholars, however, believe that
“to promote the Progress of Science and the Useful Arts” grants
general power to Congress.9 What, then, is the constitutional
meaning of an “Inventor”? Moreover, has Congress properly
5

Vandenburg, supra note 1, at 205.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
7
Adam Mossoff, The First-to-File Provision in H.R. 1249 is
Unconstitutional: A Textual and Historical Analysis, SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR
COLLEGE OF LAW (2011), http://homepages.law.asu.edu/~dkarjala/Patent/
MossoffHR1249Unconstitutional(2011).pdf.
8
Sharp, supra note 1, at 1243.
9
Andrew M. Hetherington, Constitutional Purpose and Inter-clause
Conflict: The Constraints Imposed on Congress by the Copyright Clause, 9
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 457, 507 (2003).
6
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observed this in passage of the AIA?
The common usage of the word “inventor” generally refers to a
first inventor, not the second individual to discover the same or
similar idea.10 In certain instances, however, “inventor” means
anyone who brought the invention into another country, not
necessarily the absolute first inventor in the world.11 When the
Constitution was drafted, “inventor” meant “one who produces
something new; a devisor of something not known before.”12 Only
a first inventor can devise something not previously known; a
second inventor does not produce anything new. Therefore, while a
second inventor may rediscover an idea, he or she does not actually
discover the idea.13
The Constitution was not the only enactment relating to patent
rights in the early days of the Republic. In 1790, Congress passed
the first patent act, which authorized patents for any person who
“invented or discovered any useful art, manufacture, engine,
machine, or device . . . not before known or used.”14 Although
certain congressional members believe that a first-to-invent system
has been guaranteed by prior history, both the Supreme Court and
Congress believe a first-inventor-to-file system brings the U.S. in
line with the rest of the world. The Supreme Court has previously
supported the idea that the first-to-invent system, which is different
from other patent systems in place around the world, is
constitutional.15 But, does the first-inventor-to-file system comport
with prior definitions and remain constitutional? Almost every
other country in the world awards patents to the first individual to
file for a patent without considering whether the potential patentee
was actually the first to invent the particular subject matter for
10

Massey, supra note 1, at 2.
Edward C. Walterscheid, Patents and Manufacturing in the Early
Republic, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 855 (1998).
12
Id.
13
Sharp, supra note 1, at 1243.
14
Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 110 (1790).
15
Burke, supra note 1, at 87 (acknowledging Shaw v. Cooper, 32 U.S. (6
Pet.) 292, 292 (1833) (“[I]t clearly appears, that it was the intention of the
legislature, by a compliance with the requisites of the law, to vest the exclusive
right in the inventor only . . . .”)).
11
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which the patent is sought.16 Thus, Congress felt the need to align
the American patent system with the world’s view of an
“inventor.”
B. The Changing Landscape: The AIA and the “First-to-Invent”
Patent Filing System
The Supreme Court has given Congress wide latitude to define
the patent system under the IP Clause.17 The Court noted that,
although the IP Clause “is both a grant of power and a limitation,”
Congress may “[w]ithin the limits of the constitutional grant . . .
implement the stated purpose of the Framers by selecting the
policy which in its judgment best effectuates the constitutional
aim.”18 Although the Supreme Court has allowed Congress to
define “inventor” to mean the first inventor to file, this does
translate to a general prohibition against challenging the
constitutionality of the AIA.
When Congress enacted the AIA, it defined an inventor as the
individual who is the first inventor to file with the United States
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). As Congress noted in the
AIA, “converting the United States patent system from ‘first to
invent’ to . . . ‘first inventor to file’ . . . [provides] inventors with
greater certainty regarding the scope of protection provided by the
grant of exclusive rights to their discoveries.”19 With potential
patent holders worried that their inventions and proprietary
information may be encroached upon, some have challenged
Congress’s way of thinking and questioned the legitimacy of the
first-inventor-to-file system when legislative history, constitutional
drafting, and case law have indicated otherwise.
16

Id. (quoting Vito J. DeBari, International Harmonization of Patent Law:
A Proposed Solution to the United States’ First-to-File Debate, 16 FORDHAM
INT’L L.J. 687, 687–88 (1993)).
17
Timothy R. Holbrook, The Treaty Power and the Patent Clause: Are
There Limits on the United States’ Ability to Harmonize?, 22 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 1, 7 (2004).
18
Id.
19
Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3(o), 125 Stat.
284, 293 (2011) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 100).
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II. SCHOLARLY CRITICISM OF THE AIA’S CONSTITUTIONALITY
Beyond the arguments that the AIA does not comport with the
IP Clause of the Constitution, other scholars have argued that the
AIA is unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings
Clause. In his article Misguided Patent Reform: The Questionable
Constitutionality of First-to-File, Andrew L. Sharp argues that the
AIA’s constitutionality can be challenged under the Fifth
Amendment’s Takings Clause.20 The Takings Clause states that
“private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just
compensation.”21 The argument goes as follows: although the
Takings Clause traditionally applies to eminent domain seizures, it
also prevents the government from taking any constitutionallyprotected private property without just compensation.22 The
Takings Clause has four elements: (1) an individual must have
private property; (2) the government must take the private
property; (3) the taking must be without just compensation; and (4)
the taking must be in the public interest.23
When the Patent Office awards patent rights to an individual
other than the first inventor, it allows that individual to prevent the
first inventor from using their invention. Ultimately, “whatever
invention [an inventor] may thus conceive and perfect is his
individual property.”24 Using the Supreme Court’s reasoning from
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto,25 Sharp argues that patentable
inventions are private property because those inventions possess
many elements of real property.26
Sharp also analogizes to the “real property” aspects of
patentable intentions. Citing Phillips v. Washington Legal
20

See Sharp, supra note 1, at 1248 (arguing that the Takings Clause
prevents the government from taking an inventor’s private property without
compensation and for the public use).
21
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
22
Sharp, supra note 1, at 1248 (citing United States v. Willow River Power
Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502 (1945)).
23
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 496–97 (2005).
24
Sharp, supra note 1, at 1250 (quoting Solomons v. United States, 137
U.S. 342, 346 (1890)).
25
467 U.S. 986 (1984).
26
Sharp, supra note 1, at 1249–54.
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Foundation,27 Sharp notes that the Supreme Court held that “a
State may not sidestep the Takings Clause by disavowing
traditional property interests long recognized under state law.”28
As Sharp summarizes, because the Fifth Amendment applies
equally to the state and federal governments, the reasoning in
Phillips would also prohibit the federal government from taking
first inventors' property via congressional action.29 Thus, Congress
cannot simply revoke the Fifth Amendment protection that first
inventors enjoy in patentable inventions. This revocation creates an
unconstitutional “taking.” While this argument has yet to gain
traction in federal court, it remains a potential ground for
challenging the AIA.
III. FACTS AND RULINGS OF MADSTAD ENGINEERING V. USPTO
A. Facts
Mark Stadnyk is an inventor and the holder of three patents.
Stadnyk’s company, MadStad Engineering, Inc., is a Florida
corporation that developed and marketed Stadnyk’s inventions.30
Together, Stadnyk and MadStad Engineering, Inc., (collectively
“MadStad”) challenged the constitutionality of the AIA because,
allegedly, they had to “maintain heightened security around
potential inventions,” which increased business costs, including
costs resulting from maintaining security against computer hackers
who allegedly sought information about ideas that were “close to
patentability.” MadStad claimed that it invested substantially in
“hardware firewalls, . . . encryption software, . . . and the IT
expertise to install and manage [those systems],” and also had to
invest in additional equipment and facilities to produce,
manufacture, and execute prototypes “increasing time and effort
and higher costs relating to patent applications” costing

27

524 U.S. 156, 164 (1998).
Sharp, supra note 1, at 1252.
29
Id. at 1253.
30
Madstad Eng'g, Inc. v. USPTO, No. 8:12-CV-1589-T-23MAP, 2013 WL
3155280, at *1 (M.D. Fla. May 8, 2013).
28
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approximately $3,500.00.31 MadStad claimed the AIA’s new firstinventor-to-file system imposes a burden of maintaining
heightened secrecy around potential inventions until a patent
application is filed, as “much of today's intellectual property . . . is
created on or stored on computers, virtually all of which are
connected to the Internet . . . . Since the [AIA] no longer concerns
itself with actual inventorship, the new law makes it attractive and
profitable for computer hackers to steal IP and file it as their own
or to sell it to the highest bidder.”32
MadStad sued the United States, the USPTO, and the Director
of the USPTO (collectively the “Defendants”), claiming the AIA
was unconstitutional and violated the IP Clause because “Congress
[was] not authorized to award patents to the winners of the race to
file at the USPTO.” MadStad sought injunctive and declaratory
relief.33 The Defendants challenged MadStad’s standing to sue and
filed a motion to dismiss.
B. Rulings
1. District Court Rules Against MadStad: The Uphill Climb
Begins
At the district court level, the Defendants attacked MadStad’s
standing to sue the USPTO and claim that the AIA was
unconstitutional. In order to establish standing, a plaintiff must
assert facts showing that, at the moment of the filing of the suit,
“the plaintiff suffers from a concrete and imminent injury in fact
(1) that results from the invasion of a legally protected interest, (2)
that is causally and fairly traceable to the defendant’s challenged
conduct, and (3) that a favorable judicial determination likely will
redress.”34 These three factors “constitute the core of Article III’s
case-or-controversy requirement, and the party invoking federal

31

Id. at *1–2.
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555 (1992)).
32
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jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing its existence.”35
MadStad argued that it suffered four “concrete injuries” from
the enactment of the AIA: (1) the burden of maintaining
heightened security protocols; (2) the need to maintain additional
equipment to expedite product development; (3) the increased time
and effort caused by the need to file additional patent applications;
and (4) lost business and investment opportunities caused by the
“chilling effect” of the AIA.36 The Defendants argued that
MadStad’s harms were not actual or imminent (not “certainly
impending”) and were partially within MadStad’s control.37
After analyzing both sides’ arguments, the district court
discussed Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, the Supreme
Court’s then-current directive on Article III standing.38 In Clapper,
the Supreme Court reversed a judgment of the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals but agreed that, under Article III, an injury must
be “concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent.”39 The
MadStad district court stated that “imminence is concededly . . . an
elastic concept, it cannot be stretched beyond its purpose, which is
to ensure that the alleged injury is not too speculative for Article
III purposes . . . . [T]hreatened injury must be certainly impending
to constitute injury in fact . . . . [A]llegations of possible future
injury” are insufficient.40 The district court in MadStad then
recounted the injuries pled by the plaintiffs in Clapper, which
included heightened travel costs for fear of government monitoring
of personal conversations under the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA), and noted that the Supreme Court
determined that the “highly attenuated chain of possibilities
present[ed] no prospect of a ‘certainly impending’ injury to the
plaintiffs.”41 Finally, the MadStad court further emphasized that,
35

Id. at *3.
Id. at *2–3.
37
Id.
38
Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013). The case of Susan
B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334 (2014), the Supreme Court’s new
directive on standing, was not decided until 2014.
39
Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1140 (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed
Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2473, 2474 (2010)).
40
Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147.
41
Id. at 1148.
36
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although the Clapper plaintiffs contended that they had standing
because of costs incurred due to the reasonable risk of harm, the
plaintiff’s costs were a form of “self-inflicted injuries” that were
not “fairly traceable” to the claim.42
The district court then compared the facts of Clapper to
Madstad’s case. The MadStad court believed that, although the two
cases had remarkably different fact patterns, there were some
similarities: each plaintiff tested the constitutionality of a statute,
and each plaintiff triggered an especially rigorous inquiry into the
qualifications for his standing. Further, both plaintiffs responded to
a perceived need to expend money to avoid “entirely hypothetical
consequences of legislation;” that is, “the plaintiffs expended funds
. . . in response to conjectural events . . . controlled entirely by the
judgment and discretion of the plaintiffs.”43 Relying on Clapper,
the district court held that MadStad did not have standing, and
granted the Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
2. Federal Circuit Hearing: No Rest for MadStad
Madstad appealed the dismissal and requested that the Federal
Circuit declare the AIA unconstitutional.44 The Federal Circuit
affirmed the lower court’s ruling and did not address the
constitutionality argument.45
a. Federal Circuit jurisdiction
In the Federal Circuit’s opinion, the court first discussed
whether it was authorized to hear the case under Article III. The
court held that, based on previous Supreme Court rulings, the
court’s jurisdiction was proper because (1) a resolution of the
constitutional challenge would require the court to interpret the
terms “inventor” and “first-inventor-to-file” under the AIA and to
assess the interactions between those terms and the use of those
terms in the IP Clause in the Constitution; and (2) both parties’
42

Id. at 1152.
MadStad Eng’g, 2013 WL 3155280, at *5.
44
MadStad Eng’g v. USPTO, 756 F.3d 1366, 1367 (2014).
45
Id. at 1380.
43

216 WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 10:3

briefs made clear that the definitional matters were at the heart of
the dispute—precisely the type of issue the Supreme Court has
classified as substantial in the relevant sense, as defined by its
“importance of the issue to the federal system as a whole.”46
Further, the court emphasized that Congress placed appeals for
constitutional inquiries involving patents “within the province of
the Federal Circuit.”47
b. MadStad’s failed standing arguments
The court next addressed MadStad’s standing to sue. The court
recounted the minimum standing requirements, described above.48
It then recounted the lower court’s reliance on Clapper and agreed
with the lower court that an “acutely attenuated concatenation of
events” was required for MadStad to actually suffer any injury
traceable to the AIA.49
MadStad made no argument that was persuasive to the Federal
Circuit. The court analyzed all four of MadStad’s alleged injuries:
the increased risk of computer hacking, the increased time and
effort to file additional patent applications, the competitive
disadvantage relative to competitors, and the lost business and
investment opportunities.50 The court found none of those injuries
sufficient to reverse the lower court’s ruling that MadStad did not
have standing.51
MadStad claimed it suffered redressable injury because it
already expended money to enhance cyber security in response to
an alleged increase in computer hacker threats.52 The court stated
“the mere fact that MadStad, like all other people and companies,
faces cyber threats does not create standing . . . . MadStad [cited]
statistics that indicate hacking was a growing threat well before the
46

Id. at 1371 (quoting Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1066 (2013)).
Id.
48
Id. (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 149
(2010)).
49
Id. at 1373 (quoting MadStad Eng’g, 2013 WL 3155280, at *6).
50
Id. at 1373–78.
51
Id.
52
Id.
47
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AIA was even enacted.”53 The court discussed this point, finding
that there was nothing in the record to suggest that the AIA would
cause hackers to launch attacks that MadStad’s old security system
could not handle and concluded that MadStad’s assumptions did
not create standing.54
Turning to the argument that MadStad had to increase its time
and effort to file additional patent applications, the court analyzed
whether MadStad had suffered actual or imminent injury because
of the AIA.55 MadStad claimed that Stadnyk would be forced to
move the invention process more quickly and file applications
earlier than he might otherwise desire. The Defendants argued that
MadStad had not filed any patent applications after the AIA was
enacted, and that Stadnyk’s patents would still have to traverse the
patent application process.56 While the court did not necessarily
agree with the Defendant’s arguments, it agreed that MadStad did
not establish standing based on “[MadStad’s] fear of being forced
into filing a patent application . . . .”57 Quoting Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife, the court found MadStad did not provide enough
evidence to meet the “concrete, particularized, and actual or
imminent injury requirement.”58
For Madstad’s final two arguments—the competitive
disadvantage relative to competitors and the lost business and
investment opportunities—the court found MadStad’s concerns too
“speculative and generalized” to meet the injury requirement.59
MadStad argued that it would have to create in-house development
and testing centers to compete with larger companies that have
resources to protect their inventions.60 However, the court noted
53

Id. at 1374.
Id. (comparing to Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1148
(2013)).
55
Id. at 1375.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 1376.
58
Id. at 1377 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564–
65 (1992) (“[P]rofessions of ‘some day’ intentions without any description of
concrete plans or indeed even any specification of when that some day will be
do not support a finding of the ‘actual or imminent injury.’”)).
59
Id. at 1377.
60
Id. at 1378.
54
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that this would require too many assumptions to connect the injury
to the enactment of the AIA; MadStad had not shown that it
actually had set up research facilities in response to the AIA, or
that it was engaged in a research project that would use such
facilities.61 Finally, the court was not persuaded by MadStad’s
argument that non-disclosure agreements (put in place to combat
theft) would dissuade potential investment opportunities, creating
an actual or imminent injury sufficient to establish standing.62
c. Clapper as appropriate precedent
After finding that MadStad had failed to establish standing
under the standard set forth in Clapper, the court addressed
MadStad’s challenge to the district court’s reliance on Clapper.
MadStad tried (and failed) to persuade the court that Clapper’s
plaintiffs were not directly affected by the act they brought suit
under (the FISA), and that the facts of Clapper in no way
conformed to the facts in the current case.63 While the court agreed
with MadStad’s argument, it concluded that many of the general
standing principles set forth in Clapper were “enlightening and . . .
controlling.”64 Much like the plaintiffs in Clapper, MadStad
“present[ed] no concrete evidence to substantiate their fears, but
instead rest[ed] on mere conjecture about possible government
action.”65 MadStad provided no concrete evidence the enactment
of the AIA would increase IP theft, and “MadStad [did] not allege
or present evidence that anyone [was] trying to actively steal its IP
because of the AIA.”66
MadStad also argued that the court should apply the standing
analysis employed by the Supreme Court in Susan B. Anthony List
v. Driehaus.67 In Driehaus, the Court articulated a separate
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standard for the threat of impending injury.68 The Court, citing
Clapper, stated that a “challenger need not expose himself to . . .
prosecution to challenge a statute so long as the threat of arrest or
prosecution is sufficiently ‘credible’ . . . . [A]n allegation of future
injury may suffice if the threatened injury is ‘certainly impending’
or there is a ‘substantial risk’ harm will occur.”69 The Madstad
court, unpersuaded by the potential of other tests for standing
based on different factual circumstances, held Clapper applied to
MadStad and affirmed the district court’s ruling.70
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite finding that MadStad lacked standing, the court by no
means closed the door to a constitutional attack on the AIA. This,
of course, is as long as one achieves standing under Article III and
competently challenges the constitutionality of the AIA.
While the plaintiffs in MadStad failed to establish standing due
to lack of cognizable injury, future plaintiffs could do a few things
to overcome this particular hurdle. In order to achieve standing
under the Clapper standard (and to an outside extent the Driehaus
standard), plaintiffs must present a substantial risk that harm will
occur because of the enactment of the challenged congressional
act. Based on the Federal Circuit’s opinion, a plaintiff would need
to show that, because of the AIA, he or she has been harmed and
the offending party has (1) stolen the potentially patentable idea
and attempted to patent that idea; (2) hacked a patent holder’s data
systems and taken potential proprietary information for the purpose
of being the first inventor to file an invention; or (3) caused
concrete injury because of the illegal decisions of independent
actors stemming from the enactment of the AIA. Of course, any
person filing a patent under the AIA is still subject to certain
statutory requirements.71 Beyond the statutory provisions, a
68
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plaintiff could bolster their standing to sue outside of the AIA’s
provisions by showing harm similar to the Clapper standard: an
injury that is “concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent.”72
This could include: (1) evidence of harm arising out of the
enactment of the AIA, including the harms listed above; (2) a
suffering of current injury; or (3) a patentable invention or a patent
ready for filing.
If a plaintiff can establish standing, they would be able to argue
that the AIA’s first-inventor-to-file provision is unconstitutional
under the IP Clause or the Takings Clause. Thus, “the door
remains open for a challenger to attempt to establish standing by
demonstrating its alleged harms are ‘certainly impending’ through
factual circumstances that support a ‘substantial risk’ of injury
flowing from the statutory requirement.”73
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